Nash equilibria for a coalitional game on Atlanto-Scandian
Systems Analysis Laboratory
Helsinki University of Technology
P.O. Box 1100, 02015 HUT, FINLAND
Systems Analysis Laboratory Research Reports E6 April 2000
The purpose of this paper is to study the coalitional game
between the potential fishing nations of Atlanto-Scandian
(or Norwegian spring-spawning) herring. We study a three-player
cooperative game where we use Shapley value
and nucleolus as solution concepts. We show that full
cooperation between all fishing nations is not stable in the
case of efficient fishing fleets. Further, the potential new
members do not have an incentive to join in this case.
However, the case of inefficient fleets gives opposite results
and is thus a more promising case for cooperation.
Atlanto-Scandian herring, cooperative games,
international fisheries, new member problem.